Cases, Regulations and Statutes by Achenbach, Robert P., Jr.
Volume 10 | Number 7 Article 2
4-2-1999
Cases, Regulations and Statutes
Robert P. Achenbach Jr.
Agricultural Law Press, robert@agrilawpress.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Agriculture Law Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Agricultural Law Digest by an authorized editor of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Achenbach, Robert P. Jr. (1999) "Cases, Regulations and Statutes," Agricultural Law Digest: Vol. 10 : No. 7 , Article 2.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest/vol10/iss7/2
50 Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM).
The courts allowing the exclusion on sale of a principal
residence by the bankruptcy estate have reasoned that the
Bankruptcy Tax Act of 198014 provides that—
“Except as otherwise provided by this section,15 the taxable
income of the [bankruptcy] estate shall be computed in the
same manner as for an individual.  The tax shall be
computed on such taxable income and shall be paid by the
trustee.”16
Moreover, the transfer of property to the bankruptcy estate is
not to be treated as a disposition of the property “…and the
estate shall be treated as the debtor would be with respect to
such asset.”17
Two of the recent decisions allowing the exclusion18 noted
that the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 198019 also specifies that the
bankruptcy estate takes over from the debtor various tax
attributes including the holding period and the “character” of
the asset “it had in the hands of the debtor.”20  The court in the
case of In re Kerr21 concluded that to allow the exclusion
(which the court did) was consistent with In the Matter of
Kochell22 which stated that once the debtor files bankruptcy, the
estate is thereafter treated as the debtor.  Thus, in that case, the
bankruptcy estate was liable for the penalty for premature
withdrawal of funds from the debtor's IRA.23
Ownership by estate
Typically, the new income tax basis received at death24 or up
to six months after death25 l rgely eliminates the gain on post-
death sale of the principal residence.  However, if the
decedent's principal residence is sold after death with gain on
the transaction, the question is whether that gain is eligible for
the exclusion provided the ownership and use requirements are
met and the debtor had not used the exclusion within the last
two years.26
The repeal of the age requirement in 1997 eliminated one
barrier to an estate claiming the exclusion to date.  No case or
ruling has considered the eligibility of an estate for the
exclusion but it would appear that an estate should not be
prevented from claiming the exclusion if the various
requirements are met.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
     GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
EARNED INCOME CREDIT. The debtor claimed an income
tax refund due to earned income credit as exempt, under Okla.
Stat. tit. 31, § 1.1, earnings from personal services. The court
held that the earned income credit was not exempt as wages but
was nonexempt return of overpayment of taxes. In re
Dickerson, 227 B.R. 742 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 1998)
   CHAPTER 12    -ALM § 13.03[8].*
PLAN . The IRS had filed a claim for administrative expenses
resulting from unpaid post-petition employment taxes. The
debtor’s Chapter 12 plan provided for payment of the taxes
over three years, along with other installment payments of
other claims. The IRS argued that, under Section 1226(b),
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administrative expense claims had to be paid in full with the
first payments to other creditors. The court held that Section
1226(b) allowed installment payments of administrative claims
over the life of the plan. In re Ryan, 228 B.R. 746 (Bankr. D.
Or. 1999).
   FEDERAL TAXATION   -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . The debtor had timely, with extensions, filed
the 1989 return in October 1990. The debtor filed a Chapter 7
case in August 1992 which was dismissed in December 1992.
In both cases the IRS filed a claim for the unpaid 1989 taxes.
The debtor filed the current case in July 1993 and received a
discharge in November 1993. The issue was whether the first
case tolled the three-year limitation period of Section 523. The
court held that the taxes were nondischargeable because the
first Chapter 7 case tolled the three-year period in Section 523.
The case is designated as not for publication. In re Brustman,
99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,348 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1998).
The debtor had filed three previous bankruptcy cases and
agreed that the three-year limitation of Section 523 was tolled
during the cases. However, more than three years had elapsed
on several tax claims even with the tolled periods. The IRS
argued that, under I.R.C. § 6503(h), each tolled period included
an additional six months after the end of each bankruptcy case.
The court agreed and included an additional 180 days of tolled
time to each prior bankruptcy case, resulting in a total of less
than three years of untolled time between the filing of the tax
returns and the filing of the current bankruptcy petition. Thus,
the tax claims were nondischargeable. In re Daniel, 227 B.R.
675 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1998).
CONTRACTS
HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS. The plaintiff was a
grain farmer who entered into cash forward grain contracts with
the defendants who included an agricultural consultant firm, a
grain elevator and commodity trading advisor. The contracts
required a certain amount of grain to be delivered, based on the
estimated entire yield of the plaintiff. If the year’s production
fell short of the required contract amount, the deficit was
carried over to the following year. The agricultural consultants
were also supposed to acquire sufficient hedges on the futures
market to offset any price deficiencies but failed to accomplish
that goal. The plaintiff’s crops were short each year and the
hedges failed to offset the price differences, resulting in the
plaintiff owing over $300,000 on the contracts. The plaintiff
alleged that the contracts were illegal off-exchange futures
contracts. The court held that the contracts were standard cash
forward contracts under which a producer was expected to
deliver grain. The court held that the rollover provisions were
insufficient to make the contracts futures contracts under the
Commodity Exchange Act. Lachmund v. ADM Investor
Services, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
CORPORATIONS
LOANS TO SHAREHOLDERS. The plaintiff and
defendant were 50 percent shareholders and sole directors in a
corporation formed to purchase and operate a ranch.  Because
the corporation had no other assets, livestock, employees and
equipme t were leased or bartered from another corporation
owned by the defendant. The corporation’s books recorded all
of these transactions as loans from the defendant or the
defendant’s corporation. When the corporation was terminated
the loans were paid first from the liquidation proceeds. The
plaintiff argued that the loans were not bona fide corporate
debts because the loans were not ratified by all of the directors,
the plaintiff and defendant, as required by the bylaws. The
court found that the bylaws required a majority vote of
directors to ratify any corporate contract with a shareholder, an
impossibility for a corporation with only two
directors/shareholders. The court also found that the bylaws
provided that a corporate contract with a shareholder was not
invalidated by the ratification provision if the contract
otherwise complied with state law. The court held that state law
permitted corporate-shareholder contracts if the contract was
fair to the corporation. The court held that the contract was fair
to the corporation because the employees, livestock and other
borrowed assets were essential to the operation of the ranch. In
dition, the court held that the plaintiff had impliedly ratified
the loans because the plaintiff had knowledge of the use of the
assets, had signed financial statements to lenders which listed
the loan  as corporate liabilities, and had resigned as director
and refused to participate in the operation of the ranch.
L hnston v. Second Chance Ranch Co., 968 P.2d 32 (Wyo.
1998).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
LIVESTOCK ASSISTANCE . The CCC has adopted as
final regulations governing a new livestock disaster assistance
program authorized by the Agriculture, Rural Development,
Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1999 (Pub. L. 105-277) (1999 Act). As
provided in the 1999 Act, livestock producers who suffered
livestock feed losses as a result of natural disaster may apply
for benefits to compensate for losses which occurred in
calendar year 1998. Benefits will be provided to eligible
livestock producers only in those counties where a severe
natural disaster occurred, and that were subsequently approved
by the Deputy Administrator for Farm Programs. A county
must have suffered a 40 percent or greater grazing loss for three
consecutive months during the 1998 calendar year, as a result
of damage due to a natural disaster in order to be eligible;
livestock producers in counties contiguous to an approved
county are not eligible. A livestock producer in an approved
county must have suffered at least a 40 percent loss of normal
grazing for the producer's eligible livestock for a minimum of
three consecutive months. Losses will only be compensable up
to 80 percent of the total grazing available and the compensable
loss will also not exceed a county maximum set by the local
county committee. The program will be administered through
the Deputy Administrator for Farm Programs of the Farm
Service Agency. Payments will be made according to a formula
subject to funding and other limitations, including a per person
payment limitation and a provision which precludes
participation for persons whose gross revenue exceeds a
specified amount. A final payment shall not exceed 50 percent
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of the eligible loss amount determined prior to applying a
national factor, if applicable. The regulations provide that the
rules of 7 CFR Part 1400 will be used to make “person”
determinations for these purposes. 64 F d Reg. 13497 (March
19, 1999), adding 7 CFR §§ 1439.101 et seqs.
NOXIOUS WEEDS. The APHIS has adopted as final
amendments to the noxious weeds regulations which add
Solanum Tampicense Dunal (wetland nightshade) and Caulerpa
Taxifolia (Mediterranean clone) to the list of aquatic weeds and
remove Ipomoea Triloba Linnaeus from the list of terrestrial
weeds. 64 Fed. Reg. 12881 (March 16, 1999).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT . The defendant was a medical doctor who owned all of
the stock of a PACA-licensed produce dealer corporation. The
corporation purchased produce from the plaintiffs but did not
pay for all of it. The corporation did not have enough assets,
after liquidation of all accounts and property, to pay for the
produce. The plaintiffs sought recovery from the defendant
personally liable for the PACA trust fund shortfall of the
corporation. The plaintiffs cited Morris Okun, Inc. v. Harry
Zimmerman, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 346 (S.D. N.Y. 1993) as
authority for the defendant’s personal liability for the PACA
trust. The defendant argued that the defendant merely owned
the company as an investor and did not take part in any of the
management of the business; therefore, the defendant should
not be held liable for the corporation’s failure to pay for the
produce. The court cited Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Fisher, 104
F.3d 280 (9th Cir. 1997) in support of its holding that a 100
percent shareholder was in the position to control PACA trust
assets held by the corporation. The court held that the
defendant breached a fiduciary duty toward the PACA trust
assets and was personally liable for the failure of the
corporation to preserve PACA trust assets. The court noted that
the PACA was a “tough law” and that the defendant should
have known that it was the defendant’s personal responsibility
to ensure that the corporation preserved the PACA trust for
produce sellers. Golman-Hayden Co., Inc. v. Fresh Source
Produce, Inc., 27 F. Supp.2d 723 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAX
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES . The decedent’s estate
was assessed the fraud penalty for willful failure to disclose
assets of the estate on the estate tax return. The estate sought to
deduct the interest on the penalty as an administrative expense.
The IRS ruled that the interest on the fraud penalty actually
paid or accrued was deductible provided it was allowable as an
expense of the estate under local law and the expense was
incurred for the benefit of the estate. FSA 199910003, Nov. 19,
1998.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION . The IRS has provided
guidance on the ordering and taxation of distributions under
I.R.C. § 664(b)(2) from a Charitable Remainder Trust (CRT) to
reflect changes made to I.R.C. § 1(h) by the Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997 (TRA 1997). TRA 1997 amended I.R.C. § 1(h) to
provide for new capital gain tax rates for noncorporate
taxpayers. A CRT's long-term capital gains (LTCGs) and losses
fa l into three separate tax rate groups: (1) the 28-percent
group, (2) the 25-percent group, and (3) the 20-percent group.
Grouping of LTCGs properly taken into account by a CRT is
necessary in order to determine the treatment of distributions
by the CRT. The LTCGs properly taken into account by a CRT
from January 1, 1997, through May 6, 1997, are treated as
LTCGs in the 28-percent group. Notice 99-17, I.R.B. 1999-__,
__.
DEDUCTIONS. The decedent had redeemed stock received
f om the estate of a predeceased spouse. The decedent realized
gain on the redemption, based on the basis in the stock
established by the predeceased spouse’s estate for federal estate
tax purposes. The decedent’s estate tax return claimed a
deduction for the federal income tax paid on the stock
redemption. The predeceased spouse’s estate tax return was
audited and the value of the stock was increased, thus
increasing the decedent’s basis in the stock and decreasing the
income tax liability. The decedent’s estate filed for a refund
which was allowed. The IRS then assessed a deficiency against
the decedent’s estate tax because of a decrease in the deduction
for federal income tax. The estate argued that post-death events
should not be considered in determining the amount of a
deduction which was valid on the date of the decedent’s death.
The estate cited Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th
Cir. 1982) and Estate of Sachs v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 769 (1987),
rev’d, 856 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1988) which did not allow
changes based on post-death events. The court distinguished
the current case on the basis that the estate here had requested
the refund of income taxes, demonstrating that the income tax
liability was contingent as of the decedent’s death. The court
held that the income tax deduction for estate tax purposes had
to be decreased by the amount of the refund. The court also
held that the deduction for state income taxes was also
decreased since the state tax liability was dependent upon the
estate’s income tax liability. Es . of McMorris v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1999-82.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION- ALM § 5.03[2].* The
decedent died owning an interest in a general partnership, a
ranching partnership, for which an election under I.R.C. §
2032A could be made. On the federal estate tax return, the
estate did not make an election under I.R.C. § 2032A to
specially value the ranch property. The executors of the estate
requested an extension of time under I.R.C. § 301.9100-1 to
make an election under I.R.C. § 2032A with respect to the
ranch property. An extension was granted. Ltr. Rul. 9911030,
D c. 17, 1998.
VALUATION OF STOCK . The decedent owned 18 of the
outstanding 76.445 shares of the voting stock and 3,942.048 of
the outstanding 141,288.584 shares of the nonvoting stock of a
private, family-owned corporation. The remaining shares of
outstanding voting stock were owned by the decedent's three
siblings. The voting stock was subject to a 360-day restriction
on transferability or hypothecation. Both classes of stock were
entitled to the same dividends on a per-share basis, if and when
ividends were declared. Holders of the nonvoting stock were
e title  to a liquidating preference. The court valued the stock
by calculating the equity value of the corporation, adding a
premium for voting privileges, and applying a 35-percent
marketability discount to the voting stock and a 40-percent
marketability discount to the nonvoting stock. Est. f Simplot
v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. No. 13 (1999).
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FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
CAPITAL ASSETS . Legislation has been intriduced to
reduce the holding period for horses from 24 months to 12
months for purposes of determining whether horses are capital
assets under I.R.C. § 1231. H.R. 1174, 106th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1999).
CASUALTY LOSSES . The taxpayers owned a home near to
the home owned by O.J. Simpson. The taxpayers claimed a
$400,000 casualty loss deduction for loss of value of their
home, resulting from the publicity surrounding the O.J.
Simpson trial which caused buyers to be less likely to pay the
full fair market value for the property. The court disallowed the
deduction because the taxpayers did not allege any physical
damage to their property from either the murders or the media
coverage. Caan v. United States, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,349 (C.D. Calif. 1999).
CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02.*
COSTS OF GOODS SOLD. The taxpayer was a corporation
with one shareholder. The shareholder owned two unimproved
lots and the taxpayer constructed two single-family houses on
the shareholder's lots. In calculating the taxpayer’s gross
income, the taxpayer subtracted the construction expenditures
as cost of goods sold. The shareholder formed a second
corporation of which the shareholder was president and 50-
percent shareholder. The shareholder transferred the improved
lots to the second corporation which sold both properties and
reported the income from the sale of the properties. The court
held that the taxpayer could not claim the costs of the
construction as cost of goods sold because the expense was
personal to the shareholder. Jim Wood Land Clearing Co.,
Inc., T.C. Memo. 1999-90.
ELECTION. The taxpayer purchased 100 percent of an entity
considered a per se corporation under Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
2(b)(8). The entity was converted to an entity eligible to elect
its classification for federal tax purposes. The purpose of the
conversion was to elect that the entity be treated as an entity
that is disregarded as an entity separate from its owner for
federal tax purposes. However, the election was not timely
filed. The IRS allowed an extension of time to file the election.
Ltr. Rul. 9910051, Dec. 7, 1998.
EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION. The taxpayer was a
publicly-held corporation and a calendar year taxpayer. Several
of the taxpayer's corporate officers had resigned their positions
as officers and all of their duties as such. These individuals
could continue to perform services as the taxpayer’s employees
for the remainder of the year of resignation and possibly in
future years, but it was not their or the taxpayer's intent that
these individuals resume their duties as officers at any time in
the foreseeable future. These officers, however, could be listed
pursuant to the executive compensation disclosure rules under
the Securities Exchange Act as chief executive officer or one of
the highest compensated officers of the taxpayer for the year of
resignation. The IRS ruled that the resigned officers would not
be covered employees for the year of resignation and no
compensation paid to them with respect to that year would be
subject to the I.R.C. § 162(m) deduction limitation.  Ltr. Rul.
9910011, Dec. 4, 1998.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. As part of a
staff reduction plan, the taxpayer’s employer offered employees
the chance to participate in an early termination program. The
taxpayer elected to participate and in exchange for a lump-sum
payment the taxpayer signed a general release form releasing
the employer for all liability in contract, tort or any other type
of claim. The taxpayer did not file any type of claim against the
employer. The court held that the payments were included in
the taxpayer’s gross income because the payments were not
received in compensation for personal injuries. Primozic v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-95.
EMPLOYEE EXPENSES . The taxpayer was employed by
two employers during the tax year involved and submitted
employee expense statements to those employers. The
employers reimbursed the taxpayer for those expenses. The
taxpayer, however, claimed additional expenses on the
taxpayer’s income tax return. The taxpayer provided no
explanation of why those expenses were not included in the
expense statements. The court held that no deduction was
allowed for those expenses because the taxpayer did not
demonstrate that those expenses were not reimbursable by the
e l y rs. In addition, the taxpayer was denied deductions for
travel, l dging and meal expenses because the taxpayer did not
provide corroborating evidence of  the time and place of the
travel and the business purpose of the expense. Gom z v
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-94.
EXPENSE METHOD DEPRECIATION . The taxpayer
was a partner in an LLC which started a new business. The
LLC was taxed as a partnership and had a net loss for the first
tax year. In addition to the loss, the LLC claimed $17,000 in
expense method depreciation deduction for new equipment.
The taxpayer claimed a share of the net loss and expense
method depreciation on the taxpayer’s personal income tax
return. The court held that the eligibility for the expense
method depreciation deduction had to be determined at the
partnership level. Because the partnership did not have any
taxable income, no expense method depreciation deduction
could b  taken. The taxpayer argued that the regulation
involved, Treas. Reg. § 1.179-2(c)(2), was invalid. The
taxpayer contended that, since for purposes of the I.R.C. §
179(b)(3)(A) limitation, the taxpayer could aggregate taxable
incomes from different trades or businesses, the taxpayer
should be able to aggregate the taxpayer’s taxable income with
the income of the partnership under I.R.C. § 179(d)(8) to
determine the partnership's taxable income. The taxpayer also
argued that I.R.C. § 179(b)(3)(A) applied only to the taxable
income of the taxpayer derived from the trade or business by
the taxpayer. The taxpayer contended that, under I.R.C. § 701,
a partnership is not a taxpayer; therefore, that section cannot
apply to  partnership. The taxable income limitation in I.R.C.
§ 179(b)(3)(A) was, therefore, meaningless when applied to a
partnership, and Treas. Reg. § 1.179-2(c)(2) was accordingly
invalid. The court noted that a partnership is often considered a
taxpayer under the I.R.C. and held that the regulation was
valid. H yden v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. No. 11 (1999).
FARM AND RANCH RISK MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNTS. Legislation has been introduced in the U.S.
Senate to create a deduction for contributions made to a “farm
or ranch risk management account” (FARRM account). The
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deduction would be limited to 20 percent of the taxpayer’s
taxable income from an eligible farming business. An eligible
farming business is defined as “any farming business (as
defined in [I.R.C.] section 263A(e)(4)) which is not a passive
activity (within the meaning of [I.R.C.] section 469(c)) of the
taxpayer.” The contributions are to be invested in cash or other
interest bearing obligations with trust income taxable to the
trust. The FARRM account is to be a grantor trust for the
benefit of the taxpayer and contributions are to be redistributed
to the grantor within five years, with distributions included in
income. S. 642, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999).
FARMING SYNDICATES . The IRS has announced that it
is withdrawing proposed regulations §§ 1.278–2, 1.464–1,
1.464–2. I R.B. 1999-12, 34.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer raised, bred and trained
horses for 12 years. The court reviewed the factors of Treas.
Reg. § 1.183-2(b) and held that the activity was not engaged in
with the intent to make a profit: (1) the activity was not carried
on in a business-like manner because the taxpayer (a) did not
seriously investigate the activity's potential for profit, (b) did
not formulate a business plan, (c) did not prepare budgets and
other financial statements to gauge the profitability of the
activity, (d) did not have a separate business bank account, and
(e) did not change the business operation to make it more
profitable; (2) the taxpayer had no expertise at operating a
horse breeding business and did not obtain expert advice on
operating the business; (3) the taxpayer did not present
evidence that the horses would appreciate in value; (4) the
taxpayer had not profitably operated any similar business; (5)
the business never made a profit; (6) the activity had substantial
losses which did not occur from unforeseen circumstances; (7)
the losses offset income from other sources; and (8) the
taxpayer received much personal pleasure from the activity.
Lundquist v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-83.
The taxpayer owned a manufacturing company and also
operated a horse breeding and racing operation over many
years. The court reviewed the factors of Treas. Reg. § 1.183-
2(b) to hold that the activity was not engaged in with the intent
to make a profit: (1) the activity was not carried on in a
business-like manner because the taxpayer (a) did not change
the method of operation to make it profitable and (b) did not
seek expert advice on how to make the business profitable; (2)
the taxpayer had no expertise at operating a horse breeding
business and did not obtain expert advice on operating the
business; (3) the taxpayer did not present evidence that the
horses would appreciate in value; (4) although the taxpayer was
successful at manufacturing, there was no evidence that this
ability was applied to horse breeding; (5) the business never
made a profit; (6) the activity had substantial losses which did
not occur from unforeseen circumstances; and (7) the losses
offset income from other sources. Filio  v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1999-92.
In addition to regular employment, the taxpayer raised and
bred Pomeranian dogs for four years. The court reviewed the
factors of Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) to hold that the activity was
not engaged in with the intent to make a profit: (1) the taxpayer
did not have a business plan; (2) did not maintain sufficient
records to analyze the profit making capability of the activity;
(3) only five of 28 dogs generated any income; (4) the taxpayer
derived much personal pleasure from the activity; and (5) the
ctivity produced no profitable years and had substantial tax
losses. Spranger v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-93.
INCENTIVE AWARDS . The taxpayer was a manufacturer.
The taxpayer awarded prizes of trips worth more than $600 to
dealers for successfully carrying a certain amount of the
taxpayer’s products in inventory. The individuals who took the
trips could not compete in the taxpayer’s incentive program.
Only dealers could meet the criteria and be awarded prizes, and
they were the recipients of the trips awarded by the taxpayer.
Thus, each trip was a “prize or award” includible in the
recipient dealer's gross income under I.R.C. § 74 and
constituted a payment of fixed or determinable income under
I R.C. § 6041. However, the dealers which were corporations
that received trip awards were not the kind of corporations
payments to which were subject to the information reporting
requirements of I.R.C. § 6041. The dealers, whether they were
proprietorships, partnerships, or corporations, were subject to
information reporting requirements when they designated the
individuals who would take the trips. The IRS ruled that the
taxpayer was required to file information returns under I.R.C. §
6041 for the trips it awarded to noncorporate dealers if the fair
market value of a trip awarded was $600 or more in any taxable
year. The IRS also ruled that the taxpayer was not required to
file information returns with respect to the individuals
designated by the dealers to take the trip. Ltr. Rul. 9911053,
Dec. 18, 1998.
IRA-ROTH . The IRS has announced supplemental
instruc ions for the proper completion of Form 8606,
Nondeductible IRAs, for Roth IRA conversions and
recharacterizations. The announcement also clarified the proper
computation of the 10 percent additional tax for early
distributions in the case of Roth IRA conversions and
subsequent withdrawals from Roth IRA accounts. Finally, it
corrects the computation of modified AGI for purposes of Roth
IRAs on page 2 and the Ed IRA Contribution Worksheet on
page 3 in the separate instructions for Form 8606. Ann. 99-18,
I.R.B. 1999-__, __.
INTEREST RATE .  The IRS has announced that, for the
period April 1, 1999 through June 30, 1999, the interest rate
paid on tax overpayments is 8 percent (7 percent in the case of
a corporation) and for underpayments is 8 percent. The interest
rate for underpayments by large corporations is 10 percent. The
overpayment rate for the portion of a corporate overpayment
exceeding $10,000 is 5.5 percent. Rev. Rul. 99-16, I.R.B.
1999-__, __.
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS . The taxpayer had
entered into timber cutting contracts with a federal agency.
Congress enacted legislation which unilaterally changed
provisions in the contracts, including the price paid for
stumpage. The taxpayer sued the government for compensation
and received a settlement. The taxpayer also exchanged the
federal contracts for other contracts to cut timber on other land
owned by related and unrelated parties. The IRS ruled that the
l gisla ion was an involuntary conversion of the timber
contracts and that the exchange of the contracts was eligible for
like-kind exchange treatment. Ltr. Rul. 9911048, Dec. 15,
1998.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES- ALM § 4.02[16].* The
taxpayer owned a grantor trust which owned real property. The
trust sold the property by transferring the sales contract to a
Agricultural Law Digest 55
qualified intermediary. The intermediary identified replacement
property which was to be acquired with a loan. The lender
required the title to be held by a “bankruptcy remote entity” so
the trust formed an LLC which elected not to be taxed as a
separate entity. The IRS ruled that the LLC would be
disregarded for purposes of the like-kind exchange rules such
that the trust would be treated as having acquired the
replacement property. Ltr. Rul. 9911033, Dec. 18, 1998.
PENSION PLANS . For plans beginning in March 1999, the
weighted average is 6.15 percent with the permissible range of
5.54 to 6.46 percent (90 to 106 percent permissible range) and
5.54 to 6.77 percent (90 to 110 percent permissible range) for
purposes of determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C.
§ 412(c)(7).  Notice 99-15, I.R.B. 1999-12, 20.
The taxpayer received a lump-sum distribution from a
pension plan and rolled the distribution over to an IRA.
However, because the taxpayer failed to file Form 4972 as
required by Treas. Reg. § 1.402(e)(4)(B)-1, the court held that
the rollover was not entitled to tax-free treatment. Smith v.
United States, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,357 (D. Md.
1999).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
April 1999
AnnualSemi-annualQuarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 4.99 4.93 4.90 4.88
110% AFR 5.49 5.42 5.38 5.35
120% AFR 6.01 5.92 5.88 5.85
Mid-term
AFR 5.28 5.21 5.18 5.15
110% AFR 5.81 5.73 5.69 5.66
120% AFR 6.35 6.25 6.20 6.17
Long-term
AFR 5.67 5.59 5.55 5.53
110% AFR 6.24 6.15 6.10 6.07
120% AFR 6.82 6.71 6.65 6.62
PROPERTY
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER . The plaintiff purchased a
ranch with a partnership as tenants in common. The ranch
incurred financial difficulty and the partnership asked the
plaintiff to execute a quitclaim deed to the partnership of the
plaintiff’s interest so that the partnership could obtain a loan.
The deed was not supposed to be recorded but the partnership
did so without the plaintiff’s permission or knowledge. The
partnership then sold the ranch to a third party. The plaintiff
sought to set aside the transfer and to recover the plaintiff’s
interest in the ranch. The court held that the third parties
received an absolute conveyance of the property according to
recorded documents and were bona fide purchasers for value
and without notice; therefore, the transfer could not be set
aside. The court noted that the plaintiff took on the risk of the
loss when the plaintiff executed a document which transferred
the plaintiff’s interest without reservation. V nderwerf v.
Kirwan, 586 N.W.2d 858 (S.D. 1998).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
ATTACHMENT . The defendant was the spouse of a cattle
buyer w o had established a corporation in the defendant’s
name o purchase cattle because the spouse could not make the
purchases. The cattle were purchased on an account of third
parties and sold to the defendant’s corporation. That
corporation then resold the cattle. The defendant’s corporation
had a security agreement with the plaintiff for all livestock. The
spouse purchased many cattle without reimbursing the sellers
or the third party buyers. The sellers and third party buyers
argued that the plaintiff’s security interest did not attach to the
cattle because the defendant was merely a front for the spouse
who was the real owner and manager of the corporation. The
court found that the defendant had a substantial involvement in
the financial operation of the corporation and was sufficiently
aware of the transactions to be considered a bona fide officer of
the corporation; therefore, the defendant had sufficient rights in
the cattle for the security interest of the plaintiff to attach to the
cattle. The court rejected the seller’s and third party’s argument
that the plaintiff was estopped from claiming a security interest
because of the wrong-doing of the spouse and the defendant.
The court found that the seller and third party had not taken any
steps to protect themselves, even after notice that the spouse
was not making payments for the cattle; therefore, the seller
and third party could not invoke the doctrine of equitable
estoppel to defeat the plaintiff’s security interest. Contin ntal
Grain Co. v. Brandenburg, 587 N.W.2d 196 (S.D. 1998).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
LIVESTOCK CONFINEMENT FACILITIES . The
defendant counties had passed ordinances regulating the
location of concentrated livestock facilities. The plaintiff
wanted to construct a livestock confinement facility on the
plaintiff’s land which would violate the ordinances. The
plaintiff alleged that the ordinances were preempted by state
law and regulations of the Mississippi Department of
Environmental Quality. The regulations involved the distances
between concentrated livestock facilities and adjacent property.
The defendant sought a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the ordinances pending trial. The court granted
the injunction, holding that the defendants were likely to
prevail on the preemption issue and on the claims that the
ordinances violated substantive due process in that the distance
requirements were unduly oppressive. Prestage Farms v. Bd.
of Supervisors of Noxubee Co., 23 F. Supp.3d 663 (N.D.
Miss. 1998).
CITATION UPDATES
In re Scott Cable Comm., Inc., 227 B.R. 596 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1998) (bankruptcy administrative expenses), see p. 43
supra.
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Watch your mail soon for a brochure!!
The Agricultural Law Press and the Montana Society of CPAs present
“SEMINAR IN THE ROCKIES”
AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINAR
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
August 4-6, 1999
Come join us in the clear, wild mountain air of the Montana Rocky Mountains for a world-class seminar on the hottest topics in
agricultural tax and law. Space is limited for this wonderful opportunity to gain expert insight into agricultural law and enjoy the
splendor of one of America’s greatest natural wonders.
The seminar will be Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, August 4-6, 1999 at the magnificent Rock Creek Resort, near Red Lodge
located in the heart of the Montana Rockies. Registrants may attend one, two or all three days, with separate pricing for each
combination. On Wednesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On Thursday, Dr. Harl and Roger McEowen
will cover farm and ranch estate and business planning. On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover current developments in several
other areas of agricultural law. Your registration fee includes a copy of Dr. Neil Harl's seminar manuals, Farm I co e Tax (almost
300 pages) and Farm Estate and Business Planning: Annotated Materials  (nea ly 500 pages) and a copy of Roger McEowen’s
outline, all of which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small
additional charge. Continental buffet breakfasts and break refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income averaging;
earned income credit; income in respect of decedent.
• Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business deduction (FOBD), handling
life insurance, marital deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, and generation
skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities, self-
canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability companies.
• Law developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and environmental law.
Special room discounts are available for all rooms at the Rock Creek Resort. The resort is located 60 miles south of Logan
International Airport in Billings and 60 miles north of Yellowstone Regional Airport in Cody, WY. The Resort features a variety
of splendid guest accommodations and activities, including horseback riding, golf, rafting, hiking, mountain biking, and fishing.
Yellowstone national park is 60 miles to the south, just over 11,000 ft. Beartooth Pass. Picturesque Red Lodge, MT is only minutes
away.
The seminar registration fees for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles
of Agricultural Law and members of the MSCPAs are $175 (one day), $350 (two days) and $500 (three days).  The registration
fees for nonsubscribers and nonmembers are $195, $380 and $560 respectively.
All Digest subscribers should receive a brochure soon. For more information, call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958. Or
e-mail us at glaw@aol.com            Space is limited so return your registration form soon.
In the next issue: Information about the date and location of the Seminar in Paradise
